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COLORADO V. MCKNIGHT & THE EVOLUTION OF “SEARCH” 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE STATE OF COLORADO 
ABSTRACT 
On July 13, 2017, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that evidence 
obtained via conducting a dog sniff on a vehicle should have been sup-
pressed, as a direct consequence of the state’s changing marijuana laws. 
Accordingly, the decision reversed the defendant’s prior conviction on two 
drug-related charges, remanding the case back to the district court for fur-
ther review. More significantly, the case involves important Fourth 
Amendment considerations and sets new precedent for drug related 
searches in the state of Colorado. While the decision by the three-judge 
panel was unanimous in its holding, the varied reasoning asserted by each 
judge suggests that the issue may soon need to be considered by the Col-
orado Supreme Court. 
CASE OVERVIEW 
In The People of the State of Colorado v. McKnight,1 Kevin Keith 
McKnight was pulled over by Gonzales, a state police officer, for failure 
to signal when turning.2 This stop came after Gonzales observed 
McKnight’s truck parked outside of a house, which had been the subject 
of a search weeks earlier that had turned up illegal drugs.3 Consequently, 
Gonzales followed the truck and eventually pulled McKnight over.4 Of-
ficer Gonzales then testified that upon pulling the vehicle over, he recog-
nized McKnight’s passenger from previous “drug contacts” involving 
methamphetamine use.5 He then requested a second officer, Folks, to come 
to the scene with his certified drug-sniffing dog, Kilo.6 Kilo was trained to 
detect cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, methamphetamine, and marijuana by ex-
hibiting certain behavior upon detecting the odor of one of these sub-
stances.7 Kilo alerted, the Officers asked McKnight and his passenger to 
exit the truck, searched it, and found a glass pipe containing white residue.8 
Before trial, McKnight moved to suppress this evidence, asserting the of-
ficers violated his constitutional rights by conducting a dog sniff without 
  
 1. 2017 COA 93. 
 2. Id. at ¶ 7. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at ¶ 8 
 6. Id. at ¶ 9. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at ¶ 6, ¶ 10. 
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reasonable suspicion.9 The district court denied the motion, the case pro-
ceeded to trial, and a jury convicted McKnight of possession of a con-
trolled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.10 
“SEARCH” JURISPRUDENCE LEADING UP TO MCKNIGHT 
Before delving into the analysis of the McKnight Court in overturning 
the decision of the district court, it is important to place this case in proper 
context. To begin, the Fourth Amendment protects people against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures,11 and Colorado has similar protections in 
place under its state constitution.12 Thus, at either the state or federal level, 
any evidence obtained subsequent to an illegal search is suppressed. The 
Supreme Court has held that “a police officer has probable cause to con-
duct a search when ‘the facts available to [him] would warrant a [person] 
of reasonable caution in the belief’ that contraband or evidence of a crime 
is present.’”13 As a result, an individual has no legitimate privacy interest 
in possessing contraband, and so, police conduct which merely reveals the 
possession of contraband is permissible.14 This is commonly referred to as 
a binary test. Therefore, incident to a lawful traffic stop, the use of a drug-
sniffing dog does not constitute a “search,” as the dog is merely detecting 
whether or not contraband is present.15 There is no “search,” and no cor-
responding reasonableness requirement. The Colorado Supreme Court has 
ruled similarly under the Colorado State Constitution,16 while also explic-
itly holding in a subsequent case that merely walking a trained narcotic 
detection dog around a car does not implicate the protections of either the 
Fourth Amendment or Article II, section 7 of the state constitution.17 As a 
result, the initial use of a drug-sniffing dog, incident to a lawful traffic 
stop, does not constitute a search under either federal or Colorado state 
law. 
However, police officers must still have probable cause to actually 
search a vehicle. As the Supreme Court noted in Florida v. Harris:  
The question—similar to every inquiry into probable cause–-is 
whether all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens 
of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that 
a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A sniff is up 
to snuff when it meets that test.18  
  
 9. Id. at ¶ 6. 
 10. Id. at ¶ 5, ¶ 11. 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7. 
 13. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013). 
 14. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). 
 15. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005).  
 16. See People v. Esparaza, 2012 CO 22, ¶ 6. 
 17. People v. Mason, 2013 CO 32, ¶ 10. 
 18. Harris, 568 U.S. at 237. 
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In other words, a police officer has probable cause to conduct a subse-
quent, physical search of the vehicle when the facts available to him would 
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or ev-
idence of a crime is present. The dog alert will suffice in establishing this 
probable cause. Moreover, the Harris Court made clear that, when deter-
mining whether an officer has probable cause to conduct a search, a totality 
of the circumstances analysis is required.19 The Colorado courts also uti-
lize a totality of the circumstances test, however, “reasonable suspicion” 
supplants “probable cause” as the state constitutional standard.20 On its 
face, “reasonable suspicion” is a lower threshold than “probable cause.”21 
MCKNIGHT ANALYSIS 
Returning to McKnight, the issue becomes more complicated. As the 
Colorado Court of Appeals noted, since 2012, it is no longer a violation of 
Colorado law for people who are at least twenty-one years old to possess 
up to one ounce of marijuana for personal use.22 Accordingly, McKnight’s 
motion to suppress the evidence was premised on his belief that Kilo’s 
alert could reveal both something legal (an ounce or less of marijuana) or 
something illegal (illegal amounts of marijuana or another controlled sub-
stance).23 This is premised on the fact that he would have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the former, but not the latter. A detection dog rec-
ognizes an odor, not a drug24, and thus, a dog simply alerts when it has 
encountered one of the scents it has been trained to detect. Therefore, 
Judge Dailey reasoned that “it is no longer accurate to say, at least as a 
matter of state law, that an alert by a dog which can detect marijuana (but 
not specific amounts) can reveal only the presence of ‘contraband.’”25 In-
terestingly, Judges Dailey and Berger also agreed with McKnight that the 
deployment of Kilo in the first instance constituted a “search” under Col-
orado’s State Constitution, first requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, which did not exist.26 In making this determination, they reasoned 
that (1) the fact that McKnight sat parked outside a house in which illegal 
drugs had been found seven weeks before and (2) that Officer Gonzales 
had knowledge that McKnight’s passenger had used methamphetamine in 
the past did not raise a reasonable suspicion that evidence of illegal activity 
would be found in the truck.27 Finally, Judges J. Jones and Berger then 
agreed with McKnight that the dog’s alert, combined with the other cir-
cumstances, did not constitute the requisite probable cause to search the 
  
 19. Id. 
 20. People v. McKnight, 2017 COA 93, ¶ 20–21.  
 21. Id. at ¶ 21. 
 22. Id. at ¶ 1 (citing COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3)(a) (Amendment 64)). Of course, posses-
sion of marijuana remains a crime under federal law, per 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012). 
 23. McKnight, 2017 COA 93 at ¶ 16. 
 24. Harris, 568 U.S. at 246. 
 25. McKnight, 2017 COA 93 at ¶ 17. 
 26. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 23. 
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truck.28 Consequently, the dog sniff was invalid, and the illegally obtained 
evidence should have been suppressed.29 Kilo’s sniff was not up to snuff. 
Some notable differences in the reasoning of the judges includes the 
following: 
Judge Dailey: 
“No one could contend, for instance, that a federal agent’s use of dog to 
sniff a car for the presence of any amount of marijuana would constitute a 
‘search’ under the Federal Constitution. And Fourth Amendment protec-
tions do not change simply because the actor using a drug-detection dog 
changes.”30 
Judge J. Jones: 
Judge J. Jones, specially concurring, would have decided the issue on the 
grounds that the police officers lacked probable cause to search 
McKnight’s truck (as opposed to the decision that the use of the dog in the 
first instance constituted a “search,” to which he disagreed with Dailey and 
Berger).31 Moreover, he stated, “I do not opine as to whether the change 
in Colorado’s marijuana laws affects the Fourth Amendment analysis; like 
the majority, my analysis is limited to the Colorado Constitution.”32 
Judge Berger: 
Judge Berger, also specially concurring, did not think it was necessary to 
reach the probable cause determination,33 though he still agreed it was ab-
sent even though it was a “very close question.”34 In explaining how some-
one could have an enforceable expectation of privacy under state law while 
not under federal law, he stated, “The people of Colorado spoke clearly 
when they adopted Amendment 64. It is the duty of Colorado courts to 
give effect to that enactment. The Attorney General does not contend that 
Amendment 64 is displaced by the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Con-
stitution.”35 He therefore concluded:  
[W]hile a person twenty-one years of age or older in possession of less 
than an ounce of marijuana does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy under federal law with respect to law enforcement activities of 
federal officers . . . he or she does have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy under state law with respect to law enforcement activities of 
state officers.36 
  
 28. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 29. Id. at ¶ 24. 
 30. Id. at ¶ 18, fn. 4. 
 31. Id. at ¶ 33. 
 32. Id. at ¶ 48, fn. 1. 
 33. Id. at ¶ 27. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at ¶ 29. 
 36. Id. at ¶ 32. 
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IMPLICATIONS & ISSUES 
It seems inevitable that the Colorado Supreme Court will eventually 
need weigh in on this particular issue. Although the McKnight court was 
unanimous in its conclusion, the asserted reasoning of each judge varied 
greatly. Collectively, their opinions raise several difficult issues.  
First, under federal law, and within the context of a lawful traffic 
stop, the use of a drug-sniffing dog does not even implicate the Fourth 
Amendment, since no “search” has occurred.37 Therefore, the issue of rea-
sonableness becomes moot. Here, however, two judges decided that under 
the state constitution, the deployment of the dog constituted a “search” 
since a dog sniff of a vehicle could infringe upon a legitimate expectation 
of privacy under state law38 (i.e., the mere possible presence of a now legal 
activity—the possession of marijuana in legal quantities). Therefore, when 
juxtaposed against one another, this suggests that the determination for 
whether or not the use of a drug-sniffing dog in the first instance consti-
tutes a “search” hinges upon which constitution is utilized. This is prob-
lematic and begs the question: what if a federal officer utilizes a drug-
sniffing dog in the state of Colorado incident to a lawful traffic stop? While 
Judge Dailey asserted that “Fourth Amendment protections do not change 
simply because the actor using a drug-detection dog changes,”39 Judge 
Berger appeared to disagree. He concluded that, to the contrary, “while a 
person twenty-one years of age or older in possession of less than an ounce 
of marijuana does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under fed-
eral law with respect to law enforcement activities of federal officers . . . 
he or she does have a reasonable expectation of privacy under state law 
with respect to law enforcement activities of state officers.”40 As these 
starkly different answers demonstrate, which constitution is utilized can 
dramatically impact the outcome, thereby creating uncertainty and poten-
tially inequitable protection and treatment under the law. 
Second, under federal law, a totality of the circumstances test is uti-
lized to determine whether or not probable cause existed for a search, and 
the alert of a drug-sniffing dog will ordinarily constitute the requisite prob-
able cause for such a search (i.e., one that is not “unreasonable” under the 
Fourth Amendment and can therefore be conducted without a warrant). 
Probable cause exists when, under all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, 
and viewed through the lens of common sense, a reasonably prudent per-
son would think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a 
crime.41 Applying this standard, sufficient probable cause likely existed to 
search McKnight’s truck under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Kilo 
alerted to the presence of illegal drugs, since marijuana remains illegal 
  
 37. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005).  
 38. McKnight, 2017 COA 93 at ¶ 18. 
 39. Id. at ¶ 18, fn. 4. 
 40. Id. at ¶ 32. 
 41. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013). 
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under Federal law, thus constituting the requisite probable cause to search 
the vehicle. For the sake of argument, however, even assuming the alert in 
and of itself would be insufficient, probable cause may still have existed. 
For instance, the Supreme Court has also declared that probable cause to 
search may exist when the personal knowledge of the officer is sufficient 
“to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that evidence of an 
offense is in the place to be searched.”42 Officer Gonzales had personal 
knowledge of the fact that drugs had been recovered weeks earlier at the 
house McKnight remained parked outside of for fifteen minutes, and upon 
stopping McKnight, also recognized McKnight’s passenger from previous 
“drug contacts” involving methamphetamine.43 It logically follows that it 
remains at least plausible that a reasonably prudent person would think a 
search of the truck would reveal evidence of a crime, even before Kilo’s 
arrival. 
By contrast, although a totality of the circumstances test was also ap-
plied in the McKnight case, yet another subset of the three-judge panel 
determined that the dog’s alert, in combination with the other circum-
stances, did not give the police “reasonable suspicion” to search 
McKnight’s truck.44 Again, the reasoning asserted for this conclusion was 
that Kilo’s alert, in and of itself, no longer was a reliable indicator of the 
presence of contraband under Colorado’s new marijuana laws.45 Most no-
table here, however, is not that a totality of the circumstances test is uti-
lized at both the federal and state level. Certainly, factual circumstances 
vary widely from one situation to the next, so when using a totality of the 
circumstances test, courts may permissibly differ in the outcome. Rather, 
the more interesting fact is that the McKnight majority actually concluded 
that under Colorado law, a “reasonable suspicion” standard is actually a 
prerequisite for a dog sniff to occur.46 Thus, the totality of the circum-
stances test must be applied before the dog can even exit the police vehicle. 
Consequently, due to the timing component, a lower standard (reasonable 
suspicion) arguably creates a higher threshold. Again, this result remains 
at odds with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Arguably, it still remained 
plausible that under these circumstances, a reasonably prudent person 
would think a search of the truck would reveal evidence of a crime, even 
after excluding Kilo’s alert. As Judge Berger conceded, the probable cause 
question was “very close.”47 Therefore, not only does the McKnight stand-
ard appear to conflict with Federal Fourth Amendment case law, but rea-
sonable minds could differ on the actual application of the McKnight test 
  
 42. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
 43. McKnight, 2017 COA 93 at ¶ 7–8. 
 44. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 45. Id. at ¶ 16. 
 46. Id. at ¶ 19. 
 47. Id. at ¶ 27. 
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in this case. This again creates uncertainty for uniform application of the 
law, in which the Colorado Supreme Court may soon need to weigh in. 
Third, it is worth recognizing the Federal Supremacy issue that ap-
peared to hang over the McKnight court. “I do not opine as to whether the 
change in Colorado’s marijuana laws affects the Fourth Amendment anal-
ysis; like the majority, my analysis is limited to the Colorado Constitu-
tion.”48 “The Attorney General does not contend that Amendment 64 is 
displaced by the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution.”49 “No 
question has been raised in this case about whether Amendment 64 is 
preempted by federal law.”50 Each of these statements were penned by a 
different McKnight judge. They seem to collectively suggest a certain level 
of discomfort with the apparent tension between federal and state “search” 
law in the aftermath of Colorado’s evolving marijuana laws. A reasonable 
reading of these statements would indicate that (1) had the state asserted 
that federal law supersedes Amendment 64 or (2) that Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence supersedes Colorado Art. II, § 7 jurisprudence, these judges 
may have decided the case differently. Of course, asserting either one or 
both of these arguments would have placed the Colorado Attorney General 
in an untenable position. Still, the mere fact that three separate judges 
raised the supremacy issue suggests that there is at least some level of un-
easiness in applying the current framework. 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding The People of the State of Colorado v. McKnight, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals weighed in on Colorado dog sniff and “search” 
jurisprudence amidst the changing landscape in state marijuana laws. And 
while the decision by the three-judge panel was unanimous in overturning 
the defendant’s conviction, the varied reasoning offered by the three-judge 
panel suggests that the issue may soon find its way to the Colorado Su-
preme Court. Greater clarity would prove beneficial to both persons in 
Colorado and for law enforcement personnel tasked with equitable en-




 48. Id. at ¶ 48, fn. 1. 
 49. Id. at ¶ 29. 
 50. Id. at ¶ 17, fn. 3. 
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